• A social choice function (SCF) maps every preference profile to a subset of the alternatives.
• An SCF is majoritarian if it only depends on the (unweighted) majority comparisons between alternatives.
• An SCF satisfies independence of indifference voters (IIV) if an agent who is indifferent among all alternatives does not change the outcome.
• An SCF is Pareto-optimal if it never selects a Pareto-dominated alternative.
Preference Extensions
A preference extension extends preferences over alternatives to (possibly incomplete) preferences over sets of alternatives.
• Kelly's extension:
Participation
Participation prescribes that no agent can obtain a better outcome by abstaining from an election. Formally, an SCF f satisfies
Fishburn-participation implies Kelly-participation.
Computer-aided Theorem Proving
This technique yields full results plus the possibility to extract humanreadable proofs (from a minimal unsatisfiable set [MUS]).
Summary & Outlook
Two questions for future research:
• Do the impossibilities still hold for pairwise functions? • Can we get positive results with even weaker requirements?
Results
There is no majoritarian and Pareto-optimal SCF that satisfies Fishburn-participation (for four or more alternatives).
There is no majoritarian and Pareto-optimal SCF that satisfies Fishburn-participation even if preferences are strict (for five or more alternatives).
Every SCF that satisfies IIV and set-monotonicity satisfies Kelly-participation.
Example: Let f be the bipartisan set. 
